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An Ethics of Human Rights: Two
Interrelated Misunderstandings
DR. DANIEL WARNER*
Within the subject of an ethics of human rights are subsumed
some of the most controversial debates in current philosophical and
political discourse. It is helpful to begin by analyzing the debates on
the underlying questions, before examining the overall subject of an
ethics of human rights. The debates surrounding an ethics of human
rights are similar, and a proper understanding of the parts leads to a
clarification of the whole.
I. WHAT ETHICS?
The first part of the equation is ethics. Recent political discourse
in the West shows great sensitivity to ethical issues. Whether the
discussion revolves around humanitarian intervention for the Kurds,
ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, relief efforts in Somalia,
responsibility for the spread of contaminated blood in France, or the
amount and type of aid to the former Soviet Union, ethical language
has been and continues to be used by political figures.' This height-
ened sensitivity to ethical issues is a welcome change from the power
politics that dominated discussions during the post-World War II peri-
od. Ethical issues, which had been considered secondary because of the
imperatives of Realpolitik, have come to the fore. Nevertheless, the
mere use of ethical language does not necessarily mean there is clarity
of ethical thought.
A. The First Level of Confusion: The Subject of Ethical Discourse
The confusion surrounding ethical discussions has two levels. The
first level concerns the subject of the ethical discourse. Normal ethical
discourse concerns people. Any debate surrounding questions such as
* Dr. Daniel Warner is the author of "An Ethic of Respon-
sibility in International Relations" and has written extensively on
refugees and normative issues. He is the Deputy to the Director for
External Relations and Special Programs of the Graduate Institute
of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. This paper was
presented at the International Conference on Social Philosophy at
Moscow University, February 2-5, 1993.
1. See Leslie Gelb, Iran-Contra: Crimes Not Patriotism, INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE, Dec. 28, 1992, at 8; Garry Wills, Bush Granting Pardons is Simply
Unpardonable, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 28, 1992, at 8.
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"the good life" or "justice" ultimately reverts back to people. Specifical-
ly, in normal ethical discourse discussions focus on people within a
certain geopolitical space. Political theory has fixed borders, whether
within a community or a state. The limits of the community are not
considered ethical problems. These border problems are reserved for
metaethical discussions, that are usually deemed irrelevant to norma-
tive considerations.' In normative discourse, it is the problems involv-
ing the relations between a fixed group of people that draw our atten-
tion.
Traditional language concerning people has developed in interest-
ing ways. Discussions about the limits of the community and the peo-
ple involved are increasing. Even prior to the break-ups of the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, theorists were broaching the frontiers of tra-
ditional normative political theory. Whereas John Rawls' Theory of
Justice3 and Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars4 focused within
the state, others expanded normative arguments beyond the state.'
While cosmopolitan arguments have not been widely accepted, recent
political events have strengthened the belief that traditional normative
political theory that is limited within fixed borders is outmoded. Tradi-
tional normative political theory is seen as insufficient to the realities
of an interdependent world. The first problem involved in ethical dis-
course, therefore, involves the parameters of the subjects involved and
their geopolitical delimitation. Therefore, discussions about collectives
are increasing.'
Notions of group rights and collective goods transpose normal
ethical language to more than one person. Whereas the above discus-
sion points to the expanding geography of the people involved in ethi-
cal discourse, the focus here is on the expanding numbers of the sub-
jects involved in an expanding space. Movements away from limited
borders also involves movements away from individual subjects, al-
though the two are not directly related.'
2. See, e.g. TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, (Terry Nardin and David
Mapel eds., 1992) (discussions of certain ethical traditions without any focus on the
subject of the traditions of the geopolitical delimitations of those subjects).
3. JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
4. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (1977).
5. See CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979);
STANLEY HOFFMAN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS (1981); ANDREW LIKLATER, MEN AND
CITIZENS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1982).
6. See Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual, the State and Ethnic Communities in
Political Theory, 29 WORLD POL 343 (1977).
7. It should be noted, however, that these discussions of collectivities often treat
the group as an individual through the use of methodological individualism. In
discussions about more than one person, the language of the individual continues to
be used. Language hampers the ability to understand the complexity of group
dynamics. It seems impossible to look inside the group, and at the relationship
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Recent debate about the subject of ethics has pushed beyond the
individual and collectivities to discussions of kinds of subjects. While
there has been geographic and numerical expansion in the subjects of
ethical discourse, a fundamental change in the very nature of the geo-
graphic-numerical subject discussed has evolved. This appears most
clearly in discussions of state morality, where the state is merely a
juristic entity. Thus, debates surround the tension between state mo-
rality and individual morality where the categories of the two are
completely different.' This same juristic debate also arises when we
look at the ethical behavior of organizations' and businesses.'"
Discussions of the morality of international organizations and corpora-
tions are similar to discussions of state morality in that they turn
around the elusive question of the subject. Whereas the objects and
consequences of certain actions can be measured, identifying the sub-
jects of the action is difficult. For example, there may be acts with no
doers, such as the organization of a company considered responsible for
an airline crash."
This non-human aspect of the subject of ethical debate includes
the international system. The subject level can be elevated from the
individual, state, or a specific organization to the entire international
system. Thus, from Kenneth Waltz's description of the three levels of
actors in the cause of war-man, state, and the international system-one
can take each of the subjects and analyze it in terms of ethical dis-
course and ethical agency. 2 For each of the subjects, the problem in
the West is the lack of an ethical vocabulary to deal with non-person
actors. In situations dealing with actors beyond limited borders,
between the group and the outside at the same time. It is difficult to discuss the
collectivities' rights in language other than individual rights. For a helpful discussion
of methodological individualism, see Steven Lukes, Methodological Individualism Recon.
sidered, BRIT. J. OF SOC. 119 (1968). See generally Vernon Van Dyke, Collective Entities
and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal Thought, 44 J. POLITICS 21 (1982); Vernon Van
Dyke, Justice as Fairness: For Groups?, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 607 (1975).
8. See, e.g. JOHN DUNN, INTERPRETING POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY ch. 8 (1990) (dis-
tinguishing between theoretical reason at the state level and practical reason at the
level).
9. See generally Klaus-Gerd Geisen, International Organization and Ethics: Cogni-
tive Interests and the case for Pragmatic Constructivism (Paper Presentation, The
Inaugural Pan-European Conference in International Studies, Heidelberg, Germany
,Sept. 16-20, 1992).
10. John C. Coffee Jr., No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 7 MICH. L. REv. 386 (1981).
11. See David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90
MICH. L. REV. 2371-372 (1992) (discussion of the 1979 crash of an Air New Zealand
jet where the blame was placed on the organization and not individuals); See also
PETER FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE REsPONSIBILITY 145-54 (1984); Paul
Thompson, Why Do We Need A Theory of Corporate Responsibility?, in SHAME,
RESPONSBILITY AND THE CORPORATION 115-35 (Hugh Cutler ed., 1986).
12. KENNETH WALTz, MAN, THE STATE AND WAR (1959).
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collectivities, and non-persons, the ethical vocabulary in the West lacks
precision.
The level-of-analysis debate is a fundamental problem in theoreti-
cal discussions in international relations. 3 This debate can be trans-
posed to the level of modern ethical discourse. Not only is there not a
consensus on what is the subject of international relations, but even if
a consensus existed, the situation arises wherein there is no ethical
language to deal with the subject chosen. The choice of the subject
itself may be an ethical decision, and discussions about the subject of
ethical discourse are metaethical debates. In sum, the metaethical
debate surrounding the subject of ethical discourse, focused within the
substantive debate surrounding non-individual or non-human subjects,
raises perplexing questions.
B. The Second Level of Confusion: Two Concepts of Morality
The second level of confusion surrounding ethical discussions
concerns the ethical perspective from which one discusses the subject
once the subject has been decided. Thus, related to the ethical ques-
tions involving the choice of subject is the parallel question of the
choice of ethical positions. The ethical position from which one ob-
serves the defined subject or the actions of that subject must be clari-
fied. On what basis are there judgments? Who is to decide? While
these problems are similar to those elucidated in the previous discus-
sion of the subject of ethical discourse, they are not exactly the same.
In the Western tradition, ethical positions are divided between the
absolute and the situational." The absolute position involves a hier-
archical given. The rules and principles from which behavior can be
judged are usually otherworldly, as is the ultimate judgment. Situa-
tional ethics are horizontal and emerge from and interact with a given
culture or society. A similar distinction between the vertical aspect of
absolute ethics and the horizontal aspect of situational ethics can be
found in the distinction in the sources of international law between
formal treaty law and custom. Formal treaty law becomes a given,
while customary law emerges from practice. This distinction represents
two concepts of morality. 5
13. J.D. Singer, The Level.of-Analysis Problem in International Relations, 14 WORLD
POL. 77 (1967).
14. See Neil Cooper, Two Concepts of Morality, in THE DEFINITION OF MORALITY
72 (G. Wallace & A. Walker eds., 1970).
15. See HENRY SIDGWicK, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RIGHT AND WRONG 17
(1919).
There are two distinct ways of treating ethical questions . .. We may
begin by establishing fundamental principals of abstract or ideal morality,
and then proceed to work out deductively the particular rules of duty or
practical conceptions of human good or well-being through the adoption of
which these principals may be as far as possible realized under the actual
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The first concept, what might be called ideal morality or just mo-
rality, focuses on the relation between something otherworldly and an
individual. The rules by which persons are judged are given, and the
judgment concerning the individual's response to those rules is beyond
the individual or society. Social morality or ethics, on the other hand,
concerns norms that emerge from interactions between people and the
rules that emerge from those interactions. While the judgment in ideal
morality is otherworldly, ethical judgment comes from the same inter-
actions from which the norms emerged. Absolute ethics, ideal morality,
or morality all focus on vertical relationships between rules and indi-
viduals. Situational ethics, social morality, or ethics all focus on hori-
zontal relationships between social norms and people.
These two fundamental positions are traceable within different
Western ethical and religious traditions. And, it is interesting to note
the importance of these traditions. when related to certain political
cultures and systems.16 Amid all the current debates surrounding the
spread of democracy and free-market economics, insufficient attention
is given to the underlying philosophical assumptions behind specific
political and economic systems; little attention is given to the devel-
opment of what is called the "civic culture."7 Interest in the civic
culture heightened during the 1960's with development programs in
Africa. Most of the programs were failures and their failures were
improperly analyzed. Today is a renewed burst of enthusiasm involv-
ing Eastern Europe, but the problem of creating civic culture from the
experiences of the 1960's in the developing world has not been trans-
formed. The relationship between different ethical and religious tradi-
tions and the socio-economic systems that have emerged out of those
traditions is not seen. Democracy and free market economics are not
mere political and economic tools to implant on a neutral body politic.
Political and economic systems are directly related to larger ethical
and cultural phenomenon. The ethical position one chooses, as well as
the ethical subject one is focusing on, have direct bearings on political
and economic decisions.
While this previous discussion may seem a digression from the
subject of an ethics of human rights, it is a necessary prelude. Beneath
the interest in human rights throughout the world is a major misun-
conditions of human life. Or, we may contemplate morality as a social
fact-'positive morality' as it has been called-i.e. the body of opinions and
sentiments as to right and wrong, good and evil, which find prevalent in
the society of which we are members.
See also LYNNE RIENNER, AN ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
.2-3, 23 (1991).
16. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC & THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1977).
17. GABRiAL ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE Civc CULTURE: PoLrrmcAL ATrITUDES
AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY (1965).
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derstanding concerning the nature of human rights. Paralleling the
recent heightened interest in ethics without clarifying the subject and
ethical position involved in discussing ethics, there has is also height-
ened interest in human rights without clarifying the human rights
involved. The fundamental misunderstanding concerning the nature of
human rights is related to the ambiguity within one's understanding of
ethics. If the hypothesis is correct, the debates surrounding what is
ethics and human rights are related. In sum, an ethics of human
rights contains two interrelated misunderstandings.
II. WHAT HUMAN RIGHTS?
Debates on human rights have often focused on the split between
civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. These
debates have been "noisy"8 and revelatory of deep philosophical and
cultural biases. As has been noted, "the term 'human rights' is now
used in non-Western cultures, and increasingly in the West, with con-
tent that is not identical with that of Western liberal rights." 9 The
division between these two sets of rights is represented within the
International Bill of Human Rights. In following this premise, I will
briefly examine the division within the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights before describing the historical division between the two
covenants on human rights. Having shown this division, I will discuss
the relationship between the two sets of rights. In conclusion, we will
examine the relationship between the two sets of rights in terms of our
initial discussion of ethics, to show how the two sets of debates are
interrelated.
A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights' was adopted by
the General Assembly on 10 December 1948. The Declaration consists
of a preamble and 30 articles. The articles are based on two major
premises.2 Article 3 states the first major premise: "Everyone has the
right to life, liberty and the security of person."22 This statement de-
fines the basis of the individual rights which have been enveloped
within civil and political rights. Article 3 introduces articles 4 to 21,
18. STANLEY HOFFMAN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS 100 (1981) (Hoffman refers to
this debate as "the cause of a great battle").
19. Virginia A. Leary, Postliberal Strands in Western Human Rights Theory:
Personalist-Communitarian Perspectives, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 105 (Abdullah Ahmed An Na'im ed., 1992).
20. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
21. J. Morsink, The Philosophy of the Universal Declaration, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 309,
331-332 (1984) (suggesting that Articles 1 and 22 are "lead" articles for a different
type of list of rights).
22. G.A. Res. 217A (i11), supra note 20, art.3.
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which set out the civil and political rights contained within the Decla-
ration. Among these rights are: freedom from slavery or servitude;
freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment; the right to recognition as a person before the law; the
right to equal protection before the law; the right to effective legal
remedy; freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; the right to
a fair trial and public hearing by an impartial and independent tribu-
nal; the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; freedom
from interference with privacy, home or correspondence; freedom of
movement and residence; the right of asylum; the right to nationality;
the right to marry and to have a family; the right to own property;
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and
expression; the right to peaceful assembly and association; the right to
take part in the government of one's country; and, to have equal access
to public service in one's country.
Article 22 states the second major premise of the Universal Decla-
ration:
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security
and is entitled to realization, through national effort and interna-
tional co-operation and in accordance with the organization and
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his per-
sonality. 3
Articles 23 through 27 set out the other economic, social and cultural
rights contained in the Declaration. Among these rights are: the right
to work and to equal pay for equal work; the right to just and favor-
able remuneration; the right to form and join trade unions; the right to
rest and leisure, including reasonable limitations on working hours
and holidays with pay; the right to a standard of living adequate for
health and well-being; motherhood and childhood are entitled to spe-
cial care and assistance; the right to education; the right to participate
in the cultural life of the community.
Within the Universal Declaration are two major premises and two
sets of rights. The separation between the two groups of rights is ac-
centuated by the introduction to Article 22 which begins "Everyone, as
a member of society.. . "' Why is this parenthetical phrase -neces-
sary? If one re-reads the first group of articles, it is obvious that the
rights describe are actualized within society. The civil and political
rights described can only be actualized within a society where there is
a legal system. In spite of this obvious statement, the introduction to
Article 22 is an important reminder how civil and political rights are
often distinguished from economic, social and cultural rights. The par-
enthetical introduction to Article 22 infers a distinction between non-
23. GA. Res. 217A (III), supra note 20, art.22.
24. Id.
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social and social rights. As Craig Scott has noted, "[tihe political rights
in Articles 1 to 21 and the economic rights in Articles 22 to 27 are said
to be based on two different philosophical anthropologies: humans as
rational or natural agents, and humans as social beings."25
B. The International Covenants on Human Rights
The history of the International Covenants on Human Rights is
highly informative of the debate surrounding the two sets of rights and
their separation.26 This history reinforces the division between the
two premises in the Declaration and the inclusion of the parenthetical
aside in Article 22. In 1948, the General Assembly requested the Hu-
man Rights Commission to prepare a draft covenant on human rights.
One covenant was envisioned. In 1949, the Commission examined the
text of the draft and in 1950 revised the first 18 articles.
As part of the revision of the Draft International Covenant on
Human Rights, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 421 (V) in
December 1950.2 Section E of the Resolution said:
Whereas the Covenant should be drawn up in the spirit and
based on the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,
Whereas the Universal Declaration regards man as a person to
whom civic and political freedoms as well as economic, social and
cultural rights indubitably belong,
Whereas the enjoyment of civic and political freedoms and of
economic, social and cultural rights are interconnected and interde-
pendent,
Whereas, when deprived of economic, social and cultural
rights, man does not represent the human person whom the Uni-
versal Declaration regards as the ideal of the free man,
7. (a) Decides to include in the Covenant on Human Rights
economic, social and cultural rights and an explicit recognition of
25. Craig Scott, The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: To-
wards a Partial Fusion of the International Couenants on Human Rights, 27 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 769, 804-805 (1989).
26. See generally Memorandum by the Secretary-General on the Draft International
Covenant on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation (Historical Analysis of
the Question), 6th Seas., U.N. Doc. A/C.31559 (Nov.5, 1951) and Draft International
Covenant on Human Rights, 10th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955). At about the same
time that this debate was going on, a group in France drafted a declaration of rights
which tried to correct what was believed to be the individualism of the 1789 French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. The revised French Declaration of
Rights was adopted in 1946 and incorporated a recognition of economic and social
rights. For a fascinating account of this Declaration, see LEARY, supra note 19, at 116-
124. The International Covenants on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 Annex, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Seas., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, reprinted in 99 U.N.T.S. 171, 6
I.L.M. 368 (1967).
27. G.A. Res. 421, U.N. GAOR, 5th Seas.
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equality of men and women in related rights, as set forth in the
Charter of the United Nations;
(b) Calls upon the Economic and Social Council to request the
Commission on Human Rights, in accordance with the spirit of the
Universal Declaration, to include in the draft Covenant a clear
expression of economic, social and cultural rights in a manner
which relates them to the civic and political freedoms proclaimed
by the draft Covenant;
(c) Calls upon the Economic and Social Council to request the
Commission on Human Rights to take steps as are necessary to ob-
tain the co-operation of other organs of the United Nations and of
the specialized agencies in the consideration of such rights;
(d) Requests the Economic and Social Council to consider, at
its twelfth session, the methods by which the specialized agencies
might co-operate with the Commission on Human Rights with re-
gard to economic, social and cultural rights;
Why were economic, social and cultural rights not included in the
original draft? Why is there this inclusion after the drafting of the first
18 articles? As in the Universal Declaration, economic, social and cul-
tural rights came after civic and political rights.
The debate that surrounded the inclusion of economic, social and
cultural rights in the one covenant was highly contentious. Even after
the General Assembly had resolved to have one covenant and had
called upon the Economic and Social Council to request the Commis-
sion on Human Rights to include economic, social and cultural rights
in the one covenant, the debate surrounding the number of covenants
and the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights continued.
Resolution 384 (XIII) of the Economic and Social Council' adopted on
29 August 1951 includes the Report of the Commission on Human
Rights (seventh session). Section C of Resolution 384 (XIII) said:
Having noted General Assembly resolution 421 (V) calling
upon the Council to request the Commission on Human Rights to
include in the draft Covenant on Human Rights a clear expression
of economic, social and cultural rights in a manner which related
them to the civic and political freedoms proclaimed by the previous
draft of the Covenant,
Noting that the revised draft Covenant, prepared by the Com-
mission on Human Rights at its seventh session in response to this
request, contains provisions relating, inter alia, to such rights,
Considering that these provisions provide for two different
methods of implementation, without indicating which method or
methods are to apply:
(a) To political and civic rights
(b) To economic, social and cultural rights,
Conscious of the difficulties which may flow from embodying
in one covenant two different kinds of rights and obligations,
28. E.S.C. Res. 384, U.N. ESCOR.
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Aware of the importance of formulating, in the spirit of the
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and General
Assembly resolution 421 (V), economic, social and cultural rights in
the manner most likely to assure their effective manipulation,
Invites the General Assembly to reconsider its decision in
resolution 421 E (V) to include in one covenant articles on econom-
ic, social and cultural rights, together with articles on civic and
political rights.
The Third Committee devoted almost two months to the question
whether one or two covenants on Human Rights should be drafted by
the Commission on Human Rights. The debate is fascinating reading;
a reminder of the political and ideological differences that separated
countries at that time, but also a reminder that the schism between
the two sets of rights was very profound. Many of the arguments
turned on the problem of implementation, as Mrs. Roosevelt aptly
states:
(considering] the longer period of time which it will take and the
long-range planning which will be necessary to achieve the objec-
tives of the economic and social provisions of the covenant ... [T]he
draft covenant on Human Rights submitted to us by the Commis-
sion on Human Rights recognizes that the enactment of legislation
is generally sufficient to put into effect civil and political rights,
while legislation is not sufficient for the attainment of economic
and social rights. A much broader programme of action is neces-
sary.'
But, the arguments reflected more deep-seated differences than merely
implementation.
Through Resolution 384 (XIII)' , the Economic and Social Council
was asking the General Assembly to reverse its decision on one cove-
nant, a covenant that included economic, social and cultural rights in
the same document with civic and political rights. Whereas the Gener-
29. U.N. GAOR, 6th Seas., 374th plen. mtg. at 83-84, U.N. DOC. (Feb, 4, 1952)
(statement of Mrs. Roosevelt). The same type of argument was made by the United
States many years later:
We are, therefore, ready to subscribe enthusiastically to the proposition
that respect for civil and political rights, for free speech, and free election,
goes hand in hand with economic progress. We would not shy away from
going further in this discussion, but ask whether that should be done
under the rubric of human rights.
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th Seas. (statement of Richard Schifter, U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs). See also Morris B.
Abram, Human Rights and the United Nations: Past as Prologue, 4 HARV. HUM. RTs.
J. 69 (1991). But see CYRUS R. VANCE, BUREAU OF. PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPIr OF
STATE, PR 194, HuMAN RIGHTS POLICY 1 (Apr. 30, 1977). But cf WARREN CHRISTO-
PHER, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP~T OF STATE, PR 374, HUMAN RIGHTS:
PRINCIPLE AND REALISM 1 (Aug. 9, 1977) (position was re-affirmed).
30. E.S.C. Res. 384, supra note 28.
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al Assembly had given specific orders for one covenant in Resolution
421 (') 3 1 at the Fifth Session in 1951-explicitly placing economic, so-
cial and cultural rights together with civic and political rights-the
General Assembly reversed itself in Resolution 543 (VI)"2 at the Sixth
Session in 1952. Resolution 543 (VI) on the Preparation of two Draft
International Covenants on Human Rights said:
Whereas the Economic and Social Council, by resolution 303 I
(XI) of 9 August 1950, requested the General Assembly to make a
policy decision concerning the inclusion of economic, social and
cultural rights in the Covenant on Human Rights,
Whereas the General Assembly affirmed, in its resolution 421
E (V) of 4 December 1950, that "the enjoyment of civic and political
freedoms and of economic, social and cultural rights are intercon-
nected and interdependent" and that "when deprived of economic,
social and cultural rights, man does not represent the human per-
son whom the Universal Declaration regards as the ideal of the free
man",
Whereas the General Assembly, after a thorough and all-round
discussion, confirmed in the aforementioned resolution the principle
that economic, social and cultural rights should be included in the
Covenant on Human Rights,
Whereas the General Assembly, at the request of the Economic
and Social Council in resolution 384 (XIII) of 29 August 1951, re-
considered this matter at its sixth session,
The General Assembly
1. Requests the Economic and Social Council to ask the Com-
mission on Human Rights to draft two Covenants on Human
Rights, to be submitted simultaneously for the consideration of the
general Assembly at its seventh session, one to contain civil and
political rights and the other to contain economic, social and cultur-
al rights, in order that the General Assembly may approve the two
Covenants simultaneously and open at the same time for signature,
the two Covenants to contain, in order to emphasize the unity of
the aim in view and to ensure respect for and observance of human
rights, as many similar provisions as possible, particularly in so far
as the reports to be submitted by States on the implementation of
those rights are concerned."
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' was
adopted by Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered
into force on 23 March 1976. The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights', also adopted and opened for signature,
31. G.A. Res. 421, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.
32. GA Res. 543, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess.
33. Id.
34. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 Annex,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Seas., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
35. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200 Annex, U.N. GAOR, 21st Seas., Supp. No. 16, (1966), reprinted in 993 U.N.T.S.
3.
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ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI)
of 16 December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 1976. Although
various General Assembly resolutions have reaffirmed that civic and
political and economic, social and cultural rights are "interconnected
and interdependent,"' and although the two covenants were adopted
by the same Resolution, there are two separate covenants 7 and there
is no denying that " [tihis division has influenced international activi-
ties in the field of human rights."'
The two premises within the Universal Declaration and the divi-
sion of the Covenant into two covenants reflect ideological and philo-
sophical differences. The "Western doctrine" has assumed that "al-
though it is not really possible to rank human rights in order of
preference, civil and political rights appear to be of primary impor-
tance."39 Economic, social and cultural rights have been defended by
socialist States and the developing world.' Without entering into the
ideological struggle, I will now examine the relationship between the
two sets of rights.
36. See Conference Resolution XVII, The International Conference on Human Rights
in Teheran (1968), endorsed in G.A. Res. 2442, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess.; G.A. Res.
32/130, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 150, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (Dec. 16,
1977); G.A. Res. 40/114, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., (establishment of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); G.A- Res. 41/117, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., (20th
Anniversary of the Covenants); Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Res.
41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess.
37. For a detailed analysis of the reasons for separate instruments, see Scott,
supra note 25, at 791-799.
38. Preliminary Report of The New International Economic Order and the
Promotion of Human Rights: Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
ORGAN?, SESSION?, MEETINGIITEM at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/19, (June 28,
1989)(Mr. Danilo Tork, Special Rapporteur); Final Report of The New International
Economic Order and the Promotion of Human Rights: Realization of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, MEETING/ITEM at 3, U.N. Doc. ECN.4/Sub.2/1992/16 (1992). Louis
Henkin analyzed the division as follows:
Western States fought for, and obtained, a division into two cove-
nants .... The two Covenants recognize the difference in the character
of rights in various subtle ways. For example, the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is drafted in terms of the individual's rights .... The
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on the other hand,
speaks only to States, not to the individual .... There was wide
agreement and clear recognition that the means required to induce
compliance with social-economic undertakings were different from those
required for civil-political rights.
Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 10 (Louis Henkin
ed., 1981).
39. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 297 (1986).
40. Id. at 301, 307-08.
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C. The Relationship Between Civic and Political Rights and Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights4
The relationship between the two sets of rights has been set out
in various ways. In almost all cases, one finds variations on similar
themes that have become part of accepted thought over the years."2
Historically, it is noted, the first phase of human rights focused on
civil and political rights and traditional Western sources. While these
rights have generally been associated with the eighteenth century and
the French and American Revolutions, they can be traced back to the
Magna Carta of 1215 and the thoughts of traditional Western
philosophers.' The second phase of human rights resulted from the
ideas of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the
Mexican and Russian Revolutions. Ideas of economic and social justice
which grew out of the Industrial Revolution, produced economic, social
and cultural rights which were carried on by newly independent States
in their drive for development. In this sense, economic, social and cul-
tural rights were "second generation rights". As Adam Seligman notes:
"The addition of social rights to the civil and political rights of citizens
manifests not only a greater extension and universalization of citizen-
ship but also a mediation of that extreme individualism that had char-
acterized nineteenth-century liberal-individualist political theory.""
A simple list of the relationship between economic, social and
cultural rights and civil and political rights might look like this. 5
Economic, Social and Civil and





5. Unmanageably Complex vs.Manageable
41. Our discussion will focus mainly on economic and social rights. For a good
discussion of cultural rights that criticizes the liberal individualist perspective, see
Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, 20 POL. THEORY 105 (1992).
42. Philip Alston helpfully lays out these 'received" wisdoms and discusses them
in Prevention Versus Cure as a Human Rights Strategy, in DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 49-54 (Pergamon Press 1981) (Conference Report April
27-May 1, 1981, International Commission of Jurists).
43. Robert H. Kapp, Some Preliminary Views on the Relationship between Civil
and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context of Devel-
opment and on the Right to Development 3, (1978) (Mimeo, The International Com-
mission of Jurists, Geneva).
44. ADAM SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVIL SocIETY (1992).
45. See Scott, supra note 25, at 833.
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6. Ideologically Divisive/ vs.Non-Ideological/
Political Non-Political
7. Non-Justiciable vs.Justiciable
8. Aspirations or Goals vs."Real" or "Legal" Rights
Attempts at resolving the division between the rights have been
done by several authors, among them Craig Scott,' Philip Alston,47
Asbjorn Eide," Henry Shue,49 and Danilo Tuirk. 0 These efforts have
focused on showing that even negative rights - which are supposed to
entail only government abstention - require positive action. Further,
that notions of personhood, basic rights, minimum sufficiency, mini-
mum core content and dignity require that economic, social and cultur-
al rights be considered along with civil and political rights. All of these
authors argue against a hierarchy of rights and against the second-
class status of economic, social and cultural rights - a second-class
status that can be observed through the enormous disparity between
the UN committees mandated to supervise the rights.5 ' Since econom-
ic, social and cultural rights have been under constant attack in the
West, and especially in the United States, these authors have tried to
salvage these rights. According to Danilo TUrk, "the era of the
hierarchization of human rights is more or less over and that a unified
approach is to be sought in the interpretation of the relationship be-
tween the two major sets of human rights."52 Rather than repeat the
work of these authors, I conclude this paper with an investigation that
leads back to the original discussion of the complexity of under-
standing ethics. I have shown certain differences within understanding
ethics and human rights. Thus, I conclude by examining how these dif-
ferences are interrelated.
III. INTERRELATED MISUNDERSTANDINGS
The major argument followed in this examination is one proposed
by Joseph Raz.' Raz' basic point is that "morality is not right-
46. Id.
47. Alston, supra note 42, at 49-54.
48. AsBJoRN EIDE, RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD AS A HUMAN RIGHT 10-16 (Centre
For Human Rights Study Series 1, 1989).
49. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY (1980).
50. See Tdrk, supra note 38.
51. See Philip Alston, Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 332 (1987). For
an interesting discussion of the legal differences, see Marc Bossuyt, La Distinction
Juridique Entre Les Droits Civils et Politiques et Les Droits Economiques, Sociaux et
Culturels, 8 REVUE DES DROrrs DE L'HOMME 783 (1975).
52. TaLrk, supra note 38, AT 9.
53. JOSEPH RAz, Rights-Based Moralities, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 182 (Jeremy
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based."" He sets this out by endorsing the principle that "the expla-
nation and justification of the goodness or badness of anything derives
ultimately from its contribution, actual or possible, to human life and
its quality."" Thus, Raz' "humanism" is not in and of itself a moral
theory. Rather, it is a basis on which to judge moral theories.
Raz' humanistic argument leads away from right-based moralities
that focus on a morality of rights and duties. In describing the impov-
erishment of rights-based moralities, he notes that they: (1) do not give
reasons for actions which do not amount to duties; (2) do not account
for the nature of acts which are praiseworthy and yet their omission is
not morally wrong (supererogation); and, (3) do not allow moral value
to virtue and the pursuit of excellence.
What are the implications of Raz' argument concerning the impov-
erishment of right-based moralities? Raz argues that right-based mo-
ralities are usually individualistic, and that "individualistic moralities
are humanistic moralities which hold that collective goods have instru-
mental value only." ' Raz posits that humanism is compatible with
holding collective goods to be intrinsically valuable, and not instrumen-
tally valuable. He uses this example of art, "A life with art is a good in
itself, the existence of works of art is a constituent good and the quali-
ty of life with art which explains its value is the ultimate good. All
three are intrinsic goods."57 Raz uses this argument to show that
right-based theories which insist upon duties are limited. He says that
"if... others' duty to me is confined to not violating my integrity as a
person and providing me with basic needs, then I have no right to
collective goods as my interest in them is not among my basic needs
for survival. Generally, since the maintenance of a collective good af-
fects the life and imposes constraints on the activities of the bulk of
the population it is difficult to imagine a successful argument imposing
a duty to provide a collective good which is based on the interest of one
individual."" The example of art is used to show that not only life
and its quality are intrinsically valuable. Raz' major point is that
right-based theories "tend to be individualistic and to deny the intrin-
sic value of collective goods."5"
Raz's argument, to this point, is very similar to the initial distinc-
tion made between ideal morality and social morality. Ideal morality is
individualistic in that the rights deriving from ideal morality come
down to the individual. That is why in the discussion of ideal morality,
Waldron ed., 1984).
54. Id. at 182.
55. Id. at 183.
56. Id. at 186.
57. Id. at 189.
58. Id. at 190.
59. Id. at 189.
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the fact was stressed that collective rights are often seen as individual
rights through methodological individualism. Civil and political rights
in their negative aspect of non-interference can be seen to be deriva-
tive of ideal morality. The individual is given certain rights-by his
Creator, according to the preamble of the United States Declaration of
Independence'-and those rights cannot be interfered with. In this
sense, just as ideal morality is hierarchical and vertical, so are civil
and political rights. The separate individual who is protected by civil
and political rights is part of a historical/religious understanding of the
separation of the public and the private. As Adam Seligman has noted:
(T]he differentiation of civic selfhood from communal or collective
attributes was a process that, in Western Europe, took place over
hundreds of years. It owed much to the religious doctrines of sec-
tarian or ascetic Puritanism, from which the notions of the individ-
ual as possessing metaphysical and moral value emerged. That
selfhood, which, as both Marcell Mauss and Max Weber realized,
was validated in the Declaration des Droits de l'homme et du
citoyen- stemmed, ultimately, from a religious paradigm whose
roots were firmly tied to Reformation religion."
6 '
One cannot separate civil and political rights from the reli-
gious/historical underpinnings from which they emerged.
But what of economic, social and cultural rights, and social moral-
ity? Raz' argument is based on his understanding of personal autono-
my. He does not begin from a social understanding of the individual,
but seeks to reinterpret how people generally view personal autonomy
in a social context. First, Raz distinguishes between the autonomous
person's life as what it is, but also by "what it might have been and by
the way it became what it is."82 Autonomy, for Raz, is based on the
notion of achievement through choices. Second, for Raz a person is
autonomous:
if the conditions of autonomous life obtain. Those are partly to do
with the state of the individual concerned (that he is of sound
mind, capable of rational thought and action, etc.) and partly to do
with the circumstances of his life (especially that he has a sufficient
number of significant options available to him at different stages of
his life).'
Thus, in both his description of cognizant individual choices and in his
notion of sufficient number of significant choices available to the cogni-
zant individual, Raz has moved away from justifying rights merely to
protect autonomy. For Raz, "the ideal of personal autonomy (whose
realization is clearly a matter of degree) requires not merely the pres-
60. United States Declaration of Independence
61. Seligrnan, supra note 44, at 6.
62. RAZ, supra note 53, at 191.
63. Id.
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ence of options but of acceptable ones.' Certain social conditions
must exist for there to be personal autonomy.
A person whose every major decision was coerced, extracted from
him by threats to his life or that of his children, has not led an
autonomous life. Similar considerations apply to a person who has
spent his whole life fighting starvation and disease, and has no
opportunity to accomplish anything other than to stay alive ....
Now whereas this last statement sounds very much like the argu-
ments for economic, social and cultural rights being put on the same
footing as civil and political rights based on personhood and dignity,
remember that Raz is developing his argument in contradiction to
right-based theories. Raz is arguing that there are certain collective
goods that go beyond rights and duties that are intrinsically valuable.
He is pointing to the fact that if autonomy is an ultimate value, which
is argued by those who insist on only civic and political rights, then
autonomy "affects wide-ranging aspects of social practices and insti-
tutions .... Almost all major social decisions and many of the consider-
ations both for and against each one of them bear on the possibility of
personal autonomy, either instrumentally or inherently."6 He is say-
ing that there are values at the foundations of morality apart from
rights.
Raz suggests that although governments do have duties, these
duties do not derive from the rights of individual human beings. One
of the difficulties with right-based theories is that they often link
rights with duties, but one cannot locate whose duty corresponds to
certain peoples' rights. For example, when Shue says that "basic
rights . . . are everyone's minimum reasonable demands upon the rest
of humanity," 7 he footnotes this by adding, "[i]t is controversial
whether rights are claims only upon members of one's own society or
upon other persons generally.""5 By arguing for certain intrinsic col-
lective goods which form the foundation of moral values, Raz is sug-
gesting that "governments have duties which do not derive from the
rights of individual human beings.""9
Without going into concrete examples of the kinds of intrinsic
duties that government's have that do not refer back to individuals, it
is important to note Raz' conclusion where he makes a distinction in
defining narrow morality. This point is crucial because it refers to the
discussion of the difference between ideal and social morality, and the
two sets of rights. I quote Raz at length on this:
64. Id. at 192.
65. Id.
66. Id at 194-95.
67. SHUE, supra note 49, at 19.
68. Id. at 178.
69. RAZ, supra note 53, at 195.
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Morality in the narrow sense is meant to include only all those
principles which restrict the individual's pursuit of his personal
goals and his advancement of his self-interest. It is not 'the art of
life', i.e. the precepts instructing people how to live and what
makes for a successful, meaningful, and worthwhile life. It is clear
that right-based moralities can only be moralities in the narrow
sense. An individual's rights do not provide him with reasons for
action (though if he can expect his rights to be respected they in-
form him of some of his opportunities). It is impossible to assume
that an individual can conduct his whole life on the basis of the
sole motivation of respecting other people's rights. Nor is there any
reason to commend such a mode of existence. It would be a life of
total servitude to others. On the other hand, morality in the narrow
sense may be right-based. Rights do exactly what narrow morality
is supposed to do. They set limits to the individual's pursuit of his
own goals and interests. On the plausible assumption that the only
valid grounds on which the free pursuit by people of their own lives
can be restricted are the needs, interests, and preferences of other
people it becomes plausible to regard (narrow) morality as right-
based.
[T]he objection is to the notion that.., one can divide one's princi-
ples of action into those concerned with one's own personal goals
and those concerned with others, in such a way that the principles
are independent of each other. The mistake is to think that one can
identify, say, the rights of others, while being completely ignorant
of what values make a life meaningful and satisfying and what per-
sonal goals one has in life. Conversely, it is also a mistake to think
that one can understand the values which can give meaning to life
and have personal goals and ideals while remaining ignorant of
one's duties to others . . .
Raz is trying to break away from the distinction between a narrow
sense of morality focusing on the individual's pursuit of his own's in-
terests and a larger sense of morality involving others. His argument
against right-based theories is that they accentuate this individualistic
aspect of moral individualism. The very language of rights in the legal
sense is inherently individualistic.7 Raz' examination of intrinsic col-
lective goods puts in the forefront those values which cannot be isolat-
ed in terms of an individual's rights and duties. As he notes, "The
confrontational view of morality which pitches a person's own interests
and goals as not only occasionally in conflict with his obligations to
others but as deriving from independent and fundamentally different
sources is essentially an individualistic conception.""2
70. Id. at 198-99.
71. See Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1990)
(impassioned argument against "liberal legalism's court-centered and rights-centered
strategy for the protection of individual liberty").
72. RAZ, supra note 53, at 200.
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How then does the concept of ethics of human rights concern two
interrelated misunderstandings? On the most superficial level, there is
the objection that both ethics and human rights contain dichotomies
that are much too narrow. By imagining an ideal morality separated
from social interaction, one winds up with such absurd questions as:
Did Robinson Crusoe have rights before the arrival of Friday? By
imagining civil and political rights separated from economic, social and
cultural rights, one imagines such absurd situations as a society of free
speech and free elections where there would be no concern for econom-
ic, social and cultural rights, or vice versa. The recent demise of Com-
munism should put to rest once and for all the famous Omelette thesis
attributed to Lenin: "You can't make omelettes without breaking
eggs."73 This thesis has been favored by those who argued that one
set of rights had to be sacrificed for the other.7' Secondly, and in a
deeper sense, Raz' point is that the way to overcome the dichotomy
between ideal and social morality is not necessarily through right-
based theories. Ideal and social morality may be the foundations for
certain values which may be expressed through certain human rights,
but they cannot be limited to only human rights.
Thus, ethics and human rights are both misunderstood in an
interrelated fashion when they are interpreted in the narrow sense. A
wider understanding of ethics allows one to see the role of human
rights in a broader context. The difficulty with human rights discus-
sions, even those that accentuate the correlation between duties and
rights, is their attempt to narrow the focus of the discussion away from
this larger picture to a legalistic conception of rights without a moral
foundation. The privileging of rights discussion might work against
itself by ignoring the basis on which the rights were based. Morality in
the largest sense is not right-based, although human rights are based
on morality."5 Raz has persuasively shown that human rights are a
73. For a fascinating discussion of the omelette thesis, see Paul Sieghart, Economic
Development, Human Rights and the Omelette Thesis, 1 DEV. POLY REv. 95 (1983)
(Sieghart, using very primitive indicators, tried to show that there is a correlation
between economic development with the protection and enjoyment of human rights).
For a recent attempt to use indicators to measure compliance with the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, see Thomas Jabine and Denis
Johnston, Socio-economic indicators and Human Rights (January .1993) (Background
Paper, American Association for the Advancement of Science) (Presented at the
Seminar on Appropriate Indicators to Measure Achievements in the Progressive
Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Geneva).
74. See, e.g., Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take
Priority Over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HuM.
RTS. Q. 467 (1983).
75. Dorothy V. Jones makes this historical point in her discussion of the evolution
of international ethics during the 20th century:
What is frequently overlooked in discussions .. .is that the various civil,
political, social, economic, and cultural rights for human beings articulated
by the states, especially since 1945, were not set down upon a blank
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subset of morality. It is important to understand that both sets of
rights examined in this paper are included in the subset, as well as the
fact that there are areas outside of the subset that belong to the larger
whole - what Raz refers to as intrinsic collective goods. This examina-
tion of the interrelated misunderstandings of an ethics of human
rights shows that narrow understandings of ethics can include certain
aspects of human rights, but that a complete understanding of human
rights can only be encompassed within a larger understanding of eth-
ics.
As H.L.A. Hart points out:
The essential connection between the notion of right and the justi-
fied limitation of one's person freedom by another may be thrown
into relief if we consider codes of behavior which do not purport to
confer rights but only to prescribe what should be done .... ITihe
Decalogue is perhaps the most important example... it would be
a surprising interpretation of (the Ten Commandments) that treat-
ed them as conferring rights. In such an interpretation, obedience
to the Ten Commandments would have to be conceived as due to or
owed to individuals, not merely God, and disobedience not merely
as a wrong to (as well as harm to) individuals. The Commandments
would cease to read like penal statutes designed only to rule out
certain types of behavior and would have to be thought of as rules
placed at the disposal of individuals and regulating the extent to
which they may demand certain behavior from others.'
The claims of rights exist within a larger framework that might
include such notions as "Rules are to respected". There are overriding
ethical principles within which we can discuss specific sorts of rights.
Friedrich Kratochwil talks of "constitutive principles.., establishing
the practice in which the assertion of specific 'rights' figures promi-
nently."" It is in this sense, he argues, that arguments for certain
human rights, such as welfare rights, are based on what is right.
There is an obvious distinction between 'what is right' and 'having a
right,' but one cannot imagine having a right that is not based on
'what is right.'
In order to discuss an ethics of human rights, therefore, focus
should be placed on the ethical position that determines the specificity
of the human rights under consideration. This discussion showed that
page. They were inserted into a thickly textured mesh of already existing
states rights and duties .....
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a narrow conception of morality will lead to a narrow definition of
rights. A different conception of ethics based on social morality will
lead us away from the dichotomy between civil and political rights,
and economic, social and cultural rights. Ethics and human rights are
often misunderstood in a related fashion; a proper understanding of
ethics allows us to clarify the relationship between ethics and human
rights and to conceive of a cogent ethics of human rights.

